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Some Musings About the Limits of an Ethics that Can Be Applied – A Response To A 
Question About Courage and Convictions that Confronted the Author When She 
Woke Up On November 9, 2016 
Wislawa Syzmborska, from “Nothing Twice” (1957)
. . . .   the sorry fact is
that we arrive here improvised
and leave without the chance to practice.
Even if there is no one dumber,
if you're the planet's biggest dunce,
you can't repeat the class in summer:
this course is only offered once.
Karl Ove Knausgard, from My Struggle, VI (2010)
How can we know what we must never, ever repeat, when we did not even know what was happening when it 
happened?  Why was it seen only when it was over and there was no longer anything left to see?
James Baldwin, from The Fire Next Time (1963): 
A civilization is not destroyed by wicked people; it is not necessary that people be wicked, but only that they be 
spineless.
Czeslaw Milosz, from “Counsels” 
Man has been given to understand 
That he lives only by the grace of those in power.
Let him therefore busy himself sipping coffee, catching butterflies.
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CASE 1: Imagine a detailed description of a group of people -- they could be 
peasants, they could be urban dwellers -- who have almost no legally protected 
power over the conditions of their lives, and no civil and political liberties, in 
particular.  (The description I have in mind could be in a novel -- think Tolstoy --  or 
a work of history.) 
We are offered no grounds for criticizing these people.  To the contrary, the 
summary suggests that there is something admirable about the way they made the 
best of a bad situation.  Their days were filled with hard labor. They were at the 
mercy of those who had power over every aspect of their lives.  Yet they did not 
complain.  They raised families and vegetables; they had meaningful friendships.  
When they weren’t working or sleeping, they spent their time enjoying the company 
of their family and friends.  All the while, they accommodated their political 
circumstances as they accommodated the weather.  They put up with the 
constraints on their choices, and with the arbitrary exercise of power to which they 
and their neighbors were subjected.  They did their best not to provoke the wrath of 
those who had tight control over their lives, refraining from protesting when this 
wrath was directed at others.  Under the circumstances, this coping strategy was, as 
we say, the better part of wisdom. 
CASE 2: Imagine a detailed description of those who did not oppose Hitler -- the 
“Good Germans,” but also, accommodators in other countries where the final 
solution was enforced.  Focus on those among these people who had good reason to 
believe that they would be ostracized or lose their jobs, or worse, if they were in any 
way to challenge the actions or policies of those in power, or even lend a hand to 
those who were already targets of the regime’s displeasure, or refuse to give various 
signs of support to this regime.2
These people, too, were at the mercy of those who had power over every aspect of 
their lives.  And they, too, did not complain.  They raised families and vegetables; 
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spent their time enjoying the company of their family and friends.  Yet they are not 
widely admired -- certainly not for their willingness to accommodate their political 
circumstances without complaint.  To the contrary, they (or, if you like, some 
significant portion of those who fit the description) are widely agreed to have been 
cowardly accomplices to evil.  Many of them were later tormented by guilt and 
shame.  In the place of the idioms that come naturally when describing the others, 
we fault these accommodators for keeping their heads down, and not being willing 
to stick out their necks. 
This prompts the question:  What is the morally relevant difference between these 
two cases? And what does the answer to this question suggest about most of the 
people going about their business as inoffensively as possible today -- in Russia, 
North Korea, Egypt, Saudia Arabia, Pakistan, China, Hungary, Singapore, Venezuela, 
Turkey, . . . .
  
My interest in this question is, in part, theoretical:  I am interested in what grappling 
with this question can teach us about moral ideals and human virtue, and the limits 
of applied ethics   But it is also -- and even more importantly -- personal:  I would 
like to know when my accommodation to an oppressive regime would have the 
moral significance of the accommodation exemplified in the first case, and when it 
would have the moral significance of the accommodation exemplified in the second 
case.  When would I be admirably (or at least permissibly) making the best of a bad 
situation if I were to go on with my life while the people in political power deprived 
my fellow citizens and me of the basic right to express our opinions, or to assemble 
for political purposes?  And when would I be contemptibly betraying ideals that I 
myself claim to hold dear?  
I want to leave to one side conditions under which my failure to protest injustice 
would reflect my desire to live as well as I can, or a thoughtless tendency to 
conform.  I want to know when going morally astray would be an act of cowardice. 
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inhumane and unjust laws, policies, and actions would reflect a failure to appreciate 
that this is what I am, in fact, doing, and when (ii) this failure would itself reflect the 
influence, not of greed or hatred, or malice or laziness or despair, but fear -- a 
reasonable fear for my safety and security.  I realize, of course, that there are bound 
to be many borderline cases, and many cases whose location relative to the line is 
extremely difficult for anyone to discern -- even, sometimes, long after the event.3 
But this does not give me any reason to be less concerned.  To the contrary, I seek 
guidance precisely because the moral territory is so murky.
As the title of this paper indicates, my quest in the pages that follow takes the form 
of “some musings.”  I use the term deliberately:  the reader hoping for a systematic 
treatise will be disappointed.  In the pages that follow, one question gives rise to 
another in a way that is intended to capture my train of thought.   These questions 
include:  What lessons can we draw from those who have opposed injustice 
(whether overtly or covertly) at (the risk of) great cost to themselves?  What does 
the answer to this question suggest about the relation between courage and self-
love?  What are the conditions necessary for having an end one believes to be far 
more important than preserving one’s life and liberty?  What qualifies someone as 
having such an end, given that no one can be disqualified by the mere fact that there 
are many circumstances under which she would refrain from promoting this end in 
order to promote her most fundamental interests?  Are we justified in refraining 
from an act of resistance if it is very likely to have no beneficial effect?   Though I 
express many opinions on these and other matters, and though I do my best to 
explain what tempts me to hold them, my “conclusions” are tentative; each 
suggestion is offered as a provocation for further inquiry.  If there is a main thesis, it 
is not very surprising:  we must settle for something far less reassuring than the sort 
of recipe for moral discernment I was hoping to find.4  The secondary, somewhat 
more tentative, thesis is that the capacity to distinguish reasonable accommodations 
to injustice from cowardly accommodations may require – or at any rate, be 
strengthened by -- an attitude toward oneself that is in tension with the 
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*
Case I and Case II have served their purpose if they have exposed the challenge we 
face in trying to apply the Socratic insight that doing the wrong thing is worse than 
suffering even terrible losses.5   As my use of the word “insight” indicates, I am 
firmly on Socrates’s side.  This does not mean, however, that whether an action (or 
an omission) will lead one to suffer terrible losses is irrelevant to whether it would 
be wrong.  We have good reason to protect ourselves, and may even have some 
obligation to do so.  This is no less true when, all things considered, we are obligated 
to suffer great losses.  In such cases, the value of protecting ourselves merely ceases 
to override the considerations on the other side.
The two cases point to how important it is to be able to weigh the demands of self 
against the demands associated with our moral ideals; and they point to how 
difficult it is to find anything one can reliably apply in order to make the proper 
assessment.  Though this observation concerns wrongdoing of all sorts, the actions 
and inactions that concern me here involve failures to stand up for basic human 
rights, and for the human beings whose rights are being violated.  Would I be a 
coward if I were to refrain from stating my views publicly because I did not want my 
name to be added to a list of government enemies?  What if I were to lie or to hedge 
when directly asked?  Or to refuse to sign a petition?  Or to keep my distance from 
friends and neighbors who are trying to work together to improve the situation?  Or 
to refuse to appear as a witness in their defense?  When would I be wrong to salute 
the flag or give some other sign of support for the regime in power?  When would I 
be wrong to accept a job that was affiliated with the regime?6
Before considering how one might try to answer these questions, I want to elaborate 
briefly on the basic assumption that underlies my inquiry:  the assumption that we 
sometimes do wrong by keeping our heads down and pulling our necks in -- even if 
such behavior is necessary in order to avoid the very gravest harms to ourselves.  
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harming others in order to achieve some end is generally morally worse than 
making no effort to prevent others from doing harm -- and worse, too, than 
declaring one’s support for those doing harm, or even working for institutions that 
help them maintain their power.  Without rejecting these moral distinctions, I 
believe that it is possible to support evil by doing nothing to oppose it.  I assume 
further that we have positive duties, not only to help others in need, but also to 
support their fair treatment.  I assume -- to put some flesh on the bones of Case II -- 
that Pope John XXIII was correct to indict Pope Pius the XII and others for the 
“practice of prudence” that took the form of a failure to speak out against the 
massacres of Jews in the East.  I endorse Hannah Arendt’s claim that “if I obey the 
laws of the land, I actually support its constitution, as becomes glaringly obvious in 
the case of revolutionists and rebels who disobey because they have withdrawn this 
tacit consent.”7  I endorse Mary McCarthy’s claim that "if somebody points a gun at 
you and says, 'Kill your friend or I will kill you,' he is tempting you, that is all."8  And 
I assume that if “because otherwise I will die” is never a sufficient reason for pulling 
the trigger, we cannot assume that it is always a sufficient reason for making no 
effort to tackle the assailant who is willing to perform the deed herself.   I assume 
that though it is often wrong to do anything to oppose the wrongdoing of one’s 
neighbors and colleagues, and though it is often at least permissible to do nothing to 
oppose their wrongdoing, there are cases in which one is obligated to intervene.  I 
assume, for example, that I am morally obligated to make some effort to stop others 
from abusing their children.
And what if I have already made “some effort”?  This question calls attention to the 
respect in which the obligation to support basic human rights is like any imperfect 
duty:  we do not violate this obligation whenever we are brushing our teeth or 
making breakfast, or even whenever we decline an invitation to a political rally in 
support of those whose rights have been violated.   That having been said, I also 
assume that just as there are occasions on which turning one’s back on someone in 
need is wrong, no matter how many others one has helped in the past, so too, one’s 















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
efforts in the future when this will not put one at such great risk) do not always 
provide one with an adequate justification for refusing to do what one must do now 
in order to avoid supporting the policies and actions of an unjust regime.  
Unfortunately, none of these convictions provides me with answers to the questions 
raised three paragraphs earlier.  This is surely tied to the many variables that 
appear to be relevant to properly balancing the demands of self against the 
demands of justice.  Accommodation comes in degrees.  So does injustice.  One can 
support an unjust regime by refusing to help one of its victims in desperate need, or 
by refusing to help an opposition candidate.  An unjust regime can direct its abuse of 
power exclusively at those who challenge its right to do so.  Or it can target even 
those who do their best to accommodate.  And the targeting can be selective (based 
on some characteristic that has nothing to do with political affiliation) or random.  
Some unjust regimes are a vast improvement over those that have immediately 
preceded them.  Others deprive people of rights which these people had been given 
good reason to take for granted.  
These differences -- and others -- are surely relevant to what distinguishes justified 
from unjustified accommodations to injustice.  To take just the last difference:  those 
of us who are lucky enough to have enjoyed freedom of speech and association may 
have a special obligation to defend these rights when they begin to be undermined.  
It may be that in failing to defend them, we would be shirking our responsibilities as 
self-governing citizens -- responsibilities that citizens of other countries do not 
have.
How are we to “weigh” all the relevant considerations against each other?9  From 
what I can tell, the principles that spell out the conditions of right action are simply 
too general, and too indeterminate, to do the job.  This not only means that such 
principles are of no help when we confront the sort of choice situation that 
especially concerns me here.  As Arendt notes, their generality and indeterminacy is 
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much weight to the demands of self, by tempting us to apply these principles in a 
self-serving way.  This, Arendt argues, is why so few “respectable” Germans did 
anything to oppose the Nazis: “yielding easily to temptation, they most convincingly 
demonstrated through their application of traditional concepts and yardsticks . . . , 
how inadequate these had become, how little . . . they had been framed or intended 
to be applied to conditions as they actually arose.”10 
I leave the search for principles to others.  Given my pessimism about the prospects 
of this enterprise, I think it is more promising to pursue a different strategy.   I want 
to ask, instead:  which dispositions should I cultivate in order to be in the best 
possible position to appreciate the contours of the moral terrain when I confront the 
sort of choices that interest me here?  It is important to stress that in raising this 
question, my ultimate objective remains the same:  I want to understand what I am 
morally obligated to do under the stipulated circumstances.  More importantly, I 
want to be capable of discerning what I am morally obligated to do should I find 
myself in these circumstances.  My worry that, when push comes to shove, I might 
do the wrong thing, is -- fundamentally -- the worry that I might not have a 
sufficiently clear understanding of the distinction between right and wrong.  This is 
the danger to which Arendt refers when she warns against “yielding to temptation.” 
Her point is not that “respectable” people are vulnerable to doing the very thing 
they believe they have insufficient reason to do even as they are doing it.11  Her 
point, rather, is that it is very tempting for us to believe that we have sufficient 
reason to do whatever we must do in order to save our own skin.  Under the 
influence of fear, it is tempting for us to justify our refusal to accept significant 
losses by appealing to the pointlessness of sticking our necks out, and/or to other 
conflicting obligations we need to fulfill, and/or to other things we must do first, 
and/or to other good deeds we would be prevented from undertaking at some point 
in the future.
There are circumstances under which we need courage in order to do the right thing 
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in which protecting oneself against grave injury requires not lifting a finger to 
support the very conditions one claims to value far more highly than one’s own life 
and liberty.  If under these circumstances I am to have some hope of being able to 
discern the boundary between what duty requires and what is beyond its call, I need 
to consider what I must do in order to render myself less vulnerable to the desire to 
protect myself, and less vulnerable, in particular, to the distorting influence of fear.  
Having briefly explained why I think there are insurmountable impediments to what 
one might call “anti-cowardice training,” I will then turn my attention to the 
possibility of cultivating a more fear-proof relation to myself.  I will consider the 
claim this self-relation has to being a component of practical wisdom, as well as the 
threat it may pose to such wisdom.  Throughout my inquiry, my aim will be to 
discover how I might acquire the courage to see which accommodations to injustice 
are compatible with my own moral ideals. 
*
Everyone faces temptations.  But if we are lucky -- as in this respect most of the 
people reading this essay surely are -- then the sort of actions that typically tempt us 
do not involve protecting ourselves from danger at the expense of others.   They are, 
rather, actions at the expense of others that would enhance the conditions of our 
(already rather comfortable) lives.  The vice associated with such temptations is 
greed, broadly conceived:  the disposition to acquire more than one’s fair share -- 
more food, more attention, more power, more privilege.  Learning how to be a 
decent human being is, to a large extent, a matter of learning how to resist such 
temptations, and ultimately, not even to be tempted.  From a very early age, most of 
us (again, the lucky ones) get lots of practice in such self-denial.  And in the usual 
course of things, this eventually leads to the emergence of a less demanding -- less 
greedy -- self.12  
We also have many opportunities to practice overcoming our fears.  But though we 
thereby learn how to be less risk-averse, these are not typically lessons in self-
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pervasive, credible threats to, as we sometimes put it, our person, then our lessons 
in becoming less cowardly are lessons in overcoming unfounded, exaggerated, fears 
(where their unfoundedness is often a matter of their being unjustifiably strong). 
Yes, some dogs bite.  But most dogs don’t.  Yes, there will always be nasty people 
who say cruel things.  But the danger they pose is really not all that great.  Failure is 
inevitable.  But it is not to be feared to the point where one refuses to try.
For those of us lucky enough to live among people who generally treat each other 
with concern and respect, lessons in how to be less cowardly are thus typically 
lessons in how to promote our own interests.  These lessons are self-enhancing, not 
just in the sense that we improve ourselves whenever we acquire a virtue.  In 
learning how not to be so afraid of failing, we enhance our ability to behave 
prudently; we develop the resources we need in order to get what we want. 
This is all well and good.  Yet it does nothing to advance our ability to appreciate 
how to interpret our fears when they urge us to accommodate injustice.   Nor, I 
should add, does such training prepare us to deal with our fear for the safety of our 
loved ones in cases where accommodating injustice is the only way to keep them 
safe.  We may, of course, have had some experience facing moral dilemmas.  But 
whatever difficulties are involved in determining the relative priority of one’s duties 
to all human beings and one’s duties to the members of one’s family, these are not 
the difficulties involved in combating cowardice.  They are not the challenges we 
face when we need to know whether our desire to accommodate injustice is dictated 
by our apprehension of a competing duty, or whether it is -- disproportionately, if 
not exclusively --  the expression of our fear of great, irremediable, loss.
Even when fear is reasonable, or fitting, it tends to function like a vice in disposing 
us to give undue weight to ourselves.  Nothing, it tells us, is more important than 
self-preservation.13  This is not the brute self-assertion of someone crying out in 
pain.  Rather, it is a claim about how the reasons add up.  The point of the preceding 
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denial on which we can rely in order to determine when to trust this claim and 
when not to.  We have not had the sort of training that would prepare us to 
appreciate when we should resist the dear self’s demand to protect it from the sort 
of significant losses that threaten our ability to live a minimally secure, and at least 
not terribly uncomfortable, life.  We have had even less training in actually resisting 
this demand.  
Of course, bad luck could strike in other forms that would present someone with the 
opportunity of developing the sort of capacity that interests me here.  Someone 
could, for example, be frequently forced to interact with bullies, or with people who 
say hateful things about others, and who can exact a high price from anyone who 
objects.  I hope, however, that suffering under such adverse circumstances is not a 
necessary condition for developing the capacity to distinguish justifiable 
accommodations to an unjust regime from unjustifiable accommodations.  More 
importantly, in observing that we need this capacity in other circumstances too, we 
get no closer to understanding how to develop it. 
To some extent the difficulty to which I am calling attention reflects a more general 
phenomenon.  As David Wiggins notes, we cannot “measure in advance what exactly 
any kind of commitment lets [us] in for, either in and of itself or in relation to all 
[our] distinct commitments (whatever they may prove to amount to).”14  It seems to 
me, however, that the novelty of the unfamiliar circumstances that concern me is 
especially worrisome in this respect.  Not only do I lack adequate insight into what 
my commitments to a just social order, to human and civil rights and basic human 
decency commit me to do under circumstances in which I can expect to pay a high 
price for doing anything to support these ideals; it also seems that in my present 
moral condition, I have good reason to doubt that what I cannot “measure exactly in 
advance” will acquire a size and shape I can rely on when the moment of decision is 
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Someone has good reason to worry if she knows that she lacks the training she will 
need in order to pass an important test she may one day be required to take.  If what 
will be tested is her ability to resist the temptation to offer her precious self more 
protection than it has any right to expect, then she will be worried about whether 
she can count on herself to do the right thing.  Will her fear get the better of her?  
Will the moral ambiguities she is sure to confront when the stakes are high provide 
her with an excuse to put her reason to use in serving her fear?  How will she act in 
the face of profound uncertainty?  How will she know how to act?  
We have here an instance of the fear of self which the existentialists call “anxiety,” or 
“dread.”  These students of the contorted dynamics of self-consciousness would 
surely diagnose my desire to fortify myself against moral confusion as a symptom of 
this very dread.  Are they right to insist that all such quests are necessarily 
hopeless?  If, when we face the temptation to accommodate injustice, we cannot rely 
on any action-guiding principles, and if we cannot rely on any previous anti-
cowardice training, might this not mean that whatever it is to be practically wise, 
only a fool would assume that there must be something she can do to be prepared to 
correctly assess the moral challenges that matter most?  
There are certainly limits to what anyone can do to develop the sort of capacity for 
moral discernment I seek.  This is one of Marlow’s chief lessons in Joseph Conrad’s 
Lord Jim.  According to Marlow, to be truly wise is to realize that no work of ethics, 
and no moral training, contains anything we can “apply” when we are wondering 
whether, in going on with our lives as usual in the shadow of an oppressive regime, 
we will be crossing a moral line.  “It is,” Marlow declares, “from weakness unknown, 
but perhaps suspected, as in some parts of the world you suspect a deadly snake in 
every bush -- from weakness that may lie hidden, watched or unwatched, prayed 
against or manfully scorned, repressed or maybe ignored more than half a lifetime, 
not one of us is safe.”15  “I had,” he later explains, “hoped for the impossible -- for the 
laying of what is the most obstinate ghost of man’s creation, of the uneasy doubt 
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certitude of death -- the doubt of the sovereign power enthroned in a fixed standard 
of conduct.  It is the hardest thing to stumble against; it is the thing that breeds 
yelling panics and good little quiet villainies; it’s the true shadow of calamity. . . . “16 
Marlow stresses the impossibility of securing oneself against doing something 
contemptible in response to fear.  No amount of training can ensure against a 
moment of weakness.  No fixed standard of conduct has a sovereign power on which 
we can rely in the moment of truth.  The point is obvious as soon as we consider it.  
Yet as our relation to our mortality clearly indicates, something obvious and 
important need not be something we take very seriously.  This, too, is Marlow’s 
point:  to take one’s own moral vulnerability seriously is to prompt feelings of dread.
In discussing this fear, Marlow emphasizes our inability to fortify ourselves against 
morally contemptible motivations; Jim’s failure to stay with the passengers on board 
the endangered ship was, most obviously, a failure of will.  But our limitations are 
necessarily epistemic as well as motivational.  Indeed, Jim would not have failed to 
do the right thing had he not failed to see his situation aright.  
Even if, moreover, from our comfortable vantage point, it is obvious what Jim ought 
to have done (he ought not to have abandoned the ship, though there was very good 
evidence that it was about to go down, killing everyone on board), this hardly means 
that this would have been obvious to us if we had been on deck ourselves.  In the 
hard cases, the details always matter.   It is the details that determine the difference 
between (i) being “an infernal coward” for not making an effort to save one’s own 
skin17 and (ii) being brave enough not to try to save it.  There is no complete list of 
such details, nor of the moral significance each detail might have.  Thus Marlow 
reminds us:  “it’s easy enough to talk of Master Jim, after a good spread, two 
hundred feet above the sea-level, with a box of decent cigars handy, on a blessed 
evening of freshness and starlight that would make the best of us forget we are only 















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
minute and every irremediable step, trusting we shall manage yet to go out decently 
in the end -- but not so sure of it after all. . . . .”18 
Robert Adams describes a disturbing occasion on which Dietrich Bonnhoeffer 
chided a friend for not giving the Hitler salute. “If,” Adams muses, “Bonhoeffer had a 
unique opportunity, by pretending to be a Nazi, to assure the success of a conspiracy 
to overthrow the Nazi regime, then I think it would be irresponsible for him to 
refuse to give the Hitler salute, despite its moral distastefulness.  On the other hand, 
if there was no realistic hope of successful resistance, conspiratorial or otherwise, to 
Nazism within Germany, then the symbolic protest of refusing to salute might have 
been the best available way of being against Nazism.”  “Probably,” Adams continues, 
“Bonhoeffer’s actual situation lay somewhere between those extremes, though 
closer than he could believe to the more pessimistic one.  This illustrates a more 
general point . . . . What it is reasonable or good, or even makes sense, to do depends 
on our possibilities of action, and thus on our situation in the world.  What that 
situation is . . . is subject to great uncertainty.”19  “Unique opportunities” and 
“unrealistic hopes of resistance” do not come clearly marked.  Nor does the moral 
significance of the fact that a given opportunity is very-good-though-hardly-unique, 
or that, for all one can tell, one’s hopes might be unrealistic.  This is another way of 
saying that even if, as Adam Gopnik notes in a recent article on the civil rights 
movement, “resilience and resistance are the same activity, seen at different 
moments in the struggle” -- even if, we can add, it is sometimes better to preserve 
oneself as a witness --  it is often far from clear which “moment” we are now in.20 
Aware of one’s own moral vulnerability, wondering what one should and will think 
and do when the time comes, one may try running through various scenarios in 
one’s head --- or in a philosophy paper.  But as Adams and Conrad remind us, we 
would be foolish to count on such exercises as something we can apply to some 
future life experience.  Indeed, as Marlow notes, by imagining ourselves standing up 
bravely for what is right and good, we are as likely to encourage the demands of the 
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ignominious jump, Jim’s thoughts were “full of valorous deeds:  he loved these 
dreams and the success of his imaginary achievements.  They were the best parts of 
life, its secret truth, its hidden reality. They had a gorgeous virility, the charm of 
vagueness, they passed before him with a heroic tread; they carried his soul away 
with them and made it drunk with the divine philter of an unbounded confidence in 
itself.  There was nothing he could not face.”21 
*
This powerful warning could serve as a conclusion to my attempt to understand 
what distinguishes the two cases of accommodation with which I began, and a 
conclusion, too, to my attempt to discover a form of anti-cowardice training that 
would enable me to make the relevant distinctions when this is not merely an 
intellectual exercise.  This conclusion should perhaps have been obvious from the 
outset:  there is very little we can do in philosophy or in life to prepare ourselves to 
properly assess and respond to a situation in which we are tempted to 
accommodate an unjust regime that represents a credible threat to the most 
fundamental aspects of our lives; there are no principles or exercises we can apply 
in order to determine when we would be admirably making the best of things and 
when we would be cravenly going along.  This means that those of us who face very 
little risk in working to strengthen our political and legal institutions have a very 
good reason to make the necessary efforts -- a reason that supplements the many 
reasons having nothing to do with whatever anxiety we may feel about the 
condition of our mortal souls.  In short:  if we do not want our moral decency to 
depend on the luck of our circumstances, then we had better do what we can to 
ensure that the circumstances we find ourselves in do not put us to the test.22  
This having been said, I want to keep my attention focused on those unlucky 
circumstances -- the very sort of circumstances in which millions and millions of 
human beings are living right now.  The present inquiry was occasioned by my 
painful realization of how little space there may be between my moral decency and 
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(This realization was occasioned, in turn, by the sudden discovery that the legal 
structures of my country are far more vulnerable than I had assumed.  It is worth 
stressing, however, that nothing I say here depends on any particular assumptions 
about the present condition of U.S. democracy and what it portends.)23  Though I do 
not want to forget Marlow’s warning against assuming that we can prepare 
ourselves to behave decently under whatever circumstances may arise, I want to 
press on with my musings about what sort of dispositions might make us less likely 
to go morally astray under circumstances in which we cannot protect our lives, 
liberty, and livelihood without refraining from standing up for even the most basic 
human rights, and for the human beings whose rights are being systematically 
violated.  Having noted the limits of anti-cowardice training, I want to shift my focus 
away from such training and onto those who don’t seem to need it.  I want to 
consider what we might learn about moral virtue from considering the stories of 
those who have (in fiction and real life) refused to accommodate injustice, at great 
risk to themselves.  
What is special about these moral exemplars?  How do they manage to conclude that 
they should stand up for their rights, and the rights of others, even though they have 
very compelling reasons not to?  There are probably as many answers to this 
question as there are moral exemplars.  I want to focus, however, on the reasonable 
hypothesis that self-love plays a less significant role in their decisions.  Inspired by 
the example of these admirable human beings, I want to explore what it would take 
to cultivate an attitude that comes as close as any attitude possibly could to being 
the opposite of self-love.  Having explained why I believe that this attitude is an 
important element of wisdom, and why, in particular, I believe that it is an antidote 
to the corrupting effects of reasonable fear, I will then call attention to the threat it 
nonetheless appears to pose to our ability to sustain the very moral convictions 
whose implications it gives us the courage to discern.  In thus suggesting that there 
may be something deeply precarious about moral virtue, I will not reach a 
conclusion any more conclusive than Marlow’s.  I hope, however, that in exploring 
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capacity to overcome self-love, I will prompt further reflections on what it would 
take for us to be less dependent on our circumstances for whether we “go out 
decently in the end.” 
*
We are not alone in the world.  Solidarity with others helps us to find a courage we 
could not find on our own.  This suggests a way forward that none of us can afford to 
ignore.  Not only does effective resistance to systematic injustice usually require 
some sort of collective action; each of us is also less vulnerable to corruption when 
we form connections with others who share our ideals, making common cause with 
them, forging fellowships of various kinds.  In the sort of political and legal situation 
I am imagining, however -- the sort of situation in which much of the world’s people 
presently find themselves -- group organizing is itself a perilous activity; and it is 
quite possible (though hardly certain) that by refraining from such activity, one will 
never get into trouble with those in power.  This is why I have chosen to focus on 
the contribution that other people can make to our moral virtue in their capacity as 
exemplars.  
There are, we should not forget to marvel, many such models -- men and women of 
great courage who have refused to accommodate injustice.  We should study these 
people, read their biographies and their testimonials. 24 In so doing, we will not 
discover an ethical recipe we can straightforwardly apply to our own particular 
circumstances.  But we will be reminded of what is possible -- what is possible for 
people like us.  
As others have noted, one of the striking things about people who risk everything in 
order to do what they believe to be right is how often they do not take themselves to 
be acting “beyond the call of duty.”  Indeed, they often do not regard themselves as 
having any genuine alternative to acting as they do.  Acting otherwise is, they often 
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In making this confession, these people are calling attention to a psychological fact, 
as well as a normative one.  To be sure, their deeds are often the product of days and 
months -- sometimes years -- of soul-searching.  But even when this is the case, it is 
not as though, at the moment of choice, they have finally figured out how to weigh 
up the pros and cons, and have, on this basis, concluded that they have no 
justification for pursuing any other alternative.  Well aware of the fact that they 
cannot offer decisive arguments against those who make different choices, they may 
even remain unsure about whether they really have sufficiently compelling reason 
to act as they do.  Yet this modesty about their moral stance does nothing to 
undermine its strength.  David Shulman sums up this way of being in the world 
when he says “It is nothing to be right, and a true disaster to be righteous, but it is 
everything to do what you can.”25 
This Delphic statement directs our attention to something distinctive about the way 
in which a morally admirable human being apprehends and responds to what can, 
must, and ought to be done.  In so doing, it forces us to consider how what 
distinguishes the moral exemplars from the rest of us is related to their significance 
as exemplars.  Trivially, where what one ought to do is what one cannot refrain from 
doing, nothing is easier than doing what one ought to do.  But for precisely this 
reason, the moral exemplars might not seem to be of much help to us.  The 
accommodations they find unthinkable are precisely the accommodations we 
cannot help regarding as very real options.  So, it seems, they cannot be responding 
to our problem.  So it seems they cannot serve as guides to how we should respond.  
On the other hand, we can hardly deny that what they believe they must do is 
something that we can do too.  So, even though, for us, can and must come apart, the 
exemplars remind us that the impediments to action may not be as great as we 
think.26  
l will return in a moment to the suggestion that doing what one can is “everything.”  
First, I want to say a few words about other factors that make it easier for us to see 
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commitment to resisting Israeli settlement activity, the motives that underlie a 
person’s opposition to injustice are as complex and varied as the human beings 
themselves.  In addition to the solidarity I mentioned a moment ago (“nothing is 
worse than the shame of letting [one’s friends] down”), there is “anger” -- “the rage 
at having been lied to by our government for years and years, at having been made 
silently complicit in their crimes.”27  Often, too, there is “the need to put oneself to 
the test.”28  
In addition to these and other motives, however, all moral exemplars are sustained 
by “some inchoate, stubborn moral sense.”29  For those of us who make a living 
thinking about right and wrong, it is important to remind ourselves that this “sense” 
is not the output of reasoning.  Its “stubbornness” is its status as a nonnegotiable 
touchstone.  It imposes a condition on which movements in thought qualify as sound 
reasoning, and which episodes of equally impeccable inference drawing are just so 
many rationalizations, evasions, and delaying tactics.  Someone with a “stubborn 
moral sense” is someone whose very reason is conditioned by an apprehension of 
what is important and good.  Inchoate though this understanding may be, it fortifies 
her against doubt and fear, and the moral missteps to which these mutually 
reinforcing conditions give rise.  This is what accounts for her conviction that it is 
unthinkable to accommodate the unjust and inhumane actions she risks her own 
well-being in order to oppose.
This conviction is stubborn, and yet -- to repeat --  it is tied to a profound modesty:  
“It is a true disaster to be righteous.”  Camus makes the same point with an oblique 
reference to the ancient doctrine that even those who actions are morally 
contemptible act under the guise of the good:  “The most incorrigible vice is that of 
an ignorance that fancies it knows everything and therefore claims for itself the 
right to kill.”  
Camus’s lesson, and Shulman’s, is a deep one.  And this brings us to what the moral 
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suggest, one finds oneself in circumstances in which the line between justifiable and 
unjustifiable accommodations to injustice is difficult to discern, then even if one 
rightly believes oneself to be in grave danger, it is better to worry about what one 
can do in the service of the ideals one holds dear than to worry about how the 
reasons add up.  If one focuses on the latter, one is likely to become confused, or 
even worse.  As Dr. Rieux explains in The Plague, “A man can’t cure and know at the 
same time.  So let’s cure as quickly as we can.  That’s the more urgent job.”30 
If what we can do under the circumstances at issue in this paper has priority over 
what we ought to do, this is because under these circumstances we cannot count on 
much help from our reason. (More carefully:  we cannot count on our reason to 
settle the particular question at issue here.) If protecting ourselves requires 
accommodating injustice (without, however, requiring us to participate in any 
arrests, or to attack anyone’s person, or in any other way to directly interfere with 
the lives of others), and if under these circumstances we cannot rely on any action-
guiding principles or previous training to mark out the right course of action, then, 
as Arendt warns, there is little to prevent our reasoning from degenerating into self-
serving rationalizing.  When we lack the cognitive and motivational basis for 
resisting the temptation to employ our reason for the purpose of self-protection, we 
are ill advised to use this very same reason to assess the relative importance of our 
self-concern.31  
On this point, too, Marlow is out ahead of us.  Noting the intimate connection 
between cowardice and the disposition to weigh pros against cons in response to 
one’s fears, he commends “that inborn ability to look temptations straight in the face 
-- a readiness unintellectual enough, goodness knows, but without pose -- a power of 
resistance, don’t you see, ungracious, if you like, but priceless -- an unthinking and 
blessed stiffness before the outward and inward terrors, before the might of nature, 
and the seductive corruption of men -- backed by a faith invulnerable to the strength 
of facts, to the contagion of example, to the solicitation of ideas.  Hang ideas! They are 
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your substance, each carrying away some crumb of that belief in a few simple notions 
you must cling to if you want to live decently and would like to die easy!”32 
We must tread carefully here.  In appealing to Shulman and Conrad and Camus as 
guides to the morally perplexed, I do not mean to suggest that we must abandon our 
reason in order to acquire the sort of moral decency that will enable us to do the 
right thing when this involves refusing to protect our precious selves.  I mean that 
we must be disposed to give priority to what we can do when our reason does not 
appear to be of much help, and may even be likely to contribute to our confusion.
Relatedly, it is important to stress that “don’t worry so much about how the reasons 
add up” is not advice for a psychopath or even for a newly minted moral agent.  It 
applies to us, who have internalized the basic prima facie duties enumerated by 
W.D. Ross, and whose “moral sense” is thus very similar to that of the moral 
exemplars themselves.  I am assuming that my readers and I are constrained by 
moral principles and that our moral training has disposed us to avoid going morally 
astray in any number of ways.  The point is that, given that we are well-trained, 
principle-governed, conscientious moral agents, we are more likely to do the right 
thing in the sort of morally perplexing circumstances I am here discussing if we ask 
ourselves whether what appears to be an insurmountable impediment to an act of 
resistance really does prevent us from acting this way.  If we focus on what we can 
do, we are more likely to do what we would do if we really had the priorities we 
attribute to ourselves.
But here an obvious question arises:  under the relevant circumstances, aren’t we 
likely to be every bit as uncertain about what we can do as we are about what we 
should do?  The initial answer to this question is that because the former 
uncertainty concerns an empirical matter, we can resolve it more easily.  When it 
comes to resolving normative questions, we must rely on our reason.  So, if our 
reason does not yield a conclusive verdict about whether we ought to risk our necks 
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contrast, there is a very simple extra-rational method for determining how far we 
can stick out our necks: we can simply give it a try.
Shulman notes, moreover, that there is an important sense in which we know what 
we can do even before we put ourselves to the test:  we know we can try.   
Sometimes, he says, this is all we need to know.  In particular, as long as we are 
confident that our efforts will not make things worse, there are occasions when it is 
irrelevant whether we will make a difference for the better.33  Doing what one can to 
support treating people humanely and justly may involve doing something “in a 
hopeless cause, with no witnesses.”34 
I will soon return to the (ir)relevance of making a difference.  First, however, I want 
to consider whether, even if we leave this issue to one side, the preceding 
observations are really responsive to the predicament we face if, unlike the 
exemplars, we do not find keeping our heads down unthinkable.  Isn’t it an essential 
feature of this predicament that we cannot decide to (try to) be less accommodating 
without first discovering an adequate reason to be less accommodating?  To know 
that we can try to stick out our necks a bit further is not to have adequate reason to 
do so.  And given the likely costs involved in exposing ourselves in this way, could it 
really be reasonable for us to do so without adequate justification? 
This line of thought rests on the reasonable assumption that our desire to protect 
ourselves from great loss is reasonable.  Yet the moral exemplars to whom I have 
appealed are reasonable people too; they are not careless, imprudent risk-seekers.   
They appreciate as well as we do that there are more or less effective forms of 
opposition, that some risks are not worth taking, that it sometimes makes sense to 
bide one’s time.  Most of them also appreciate that some actions are “beyond the call 
of duty.”  What singles them out -- and what makes them less concerned about 
locating the line between the supererogatory and the obligatory -- is their refusal to 
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These last reflections remind us that accommodation comes in kinds and degrees.  
They also recall Adams’s point that certain forms of accommodation can also be 
means of, or at least necessary conditions for the possibility of, resisting.  In addition 
to these reminders, we need to keep in mind just how ordinary a brave person can 
be.  In a remarkable essay on the relevance of stoic philosophy to the life of a soldier, 
Vice Admiral James Stockdale calls our attention to each of these facts.  He shows us 
that one can form realistic plans of resistance even when one is a prisoner who is 
regularly subjected to torture.  He shows us that even under these circumstances, 
“can” does not mean “can, if (and only if) you have more-than-ordinary human 
powers.”  
Only a very small number of POWs who were in the North Vietnamese jail with 
Stockdale for approximately seven and a half years failed to resist their jailors.  They 
consistently resisted even though this meant “being bound with tourniquet-tight 
ropes, with care, by a professional, hands behind, jackknifed forward and down 
toward your ankles held secure in lugs attached to an iron bar, that, with the onrush 
of anxiety, knowing your upper body’s circulation has been stopped and feeling the 
ever-growing induced pain and the ever-closing-in of claustrophobia, you can be 
made to blurt out answers, sometimes correct answers, to questions about anything 
they know you know.”35  No one can avoid blurting things out under these 
conditions.  But, as Stockdale makes clear, one can pick ways of resisting when one 
is not “taking the ropes”:  “Don’t bow in public; Stay off the air; Admit no crimes, 
Never kiss them goodbye.”36  And if (when you are not being tortured, and are thus 
able to choose what to do) you are offered the opportunity to “repent,” turn it down.  
In May of 1968 “the public address system [in the prison] blared out:  ‘Those of you 
who repent, truly repent, will be able to go home before the war is over. Those few 
diehards who insist on inciting the other criminals to oppose the camp authority 
will be sent to a special dark place.’” As soon as this announcement was made, 
Stockdale used the prisoners’ system of tapping codes on the cell walls (another 
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release.”37 He is keen to stress, however, that he was not “a lone man on a white 
horse.  I didn’t have to sell that one; it was accepted with obvious relief and 
spontaneous jubilation by the overwhelming majority.”38  As one soldier put it, “We 
can’t refuse to do every degrading thing they demand of us, but [we can] pick out 
things we must all refuse to do unless and until they put us through the ropes 
again.”  “Give us the list,” he told Stockdale (who was his commander): “what are we 
to take torture for?”39 
Very few of us have someone to whom we can turn to receive this sort of order.  We 
would not have it any other way.  Precisely because no one is our commander, 
however, we need to be able to give ourselves lists of the relevant sort of 
imperatives -- to impose laws on ourselves, laws that are very specific -- as specific 
as:  Don’t bow in public.40 Such self-commands put flesh on the bones of one’s moral 
ideals.  They express these ideals; and they are an important way of ensuring that 
one does not betray these ideals even as one is making every effort to accommodate 
an inhumane and unjust system in many other ways.
Moral exemplars force us to see that drawing up such lists is itself something we can 
do.   Given that these human beings -- who are at least as wise as we are -- have 
found ways to stand up for their ideals at great risk to themselves, we -- who are no 
more worth protecting than they are -- would seem to have good reason to believe 
that we can do likewise.41  
Of course, brave people have dispositions that cowardly people lack:  the 
dispositions constitutive of bravery!   In particular, brave people are less prone than 
others to give in to the temptation to engage in self-serving rationalizations when 
they are faced with a serious threat.  But this does not mean that those we admire 
for their courage have a special capacity for developing the relevant dispositions; to 
draw this conclusion would be to assume that to be virtuous just is to have a 
capacity for virtue that wrongdoers lack.  Not only is this incompatible with holding 
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would not imply that cowards are justified in making no effort to be more like the 
moral exemplars.  An excuse is not a consideration in favor of doing something.  To 
the contrary, it is one of the things that a justification is essentially not. 
*
It is, of course, possible that developing the dispositions necessary for avoiding self-
serving rationalizations is inseparable from coming to believe that one’s moral 
obligations are more demanding than one was hoping to discover them to be.  But if 
we are in danger of demanding too little of ourselves, then isn’t this a risk worth 
taking?  Indeed, isn’t it a reasonable risk, even if we have obligations to ourselves, as 
well as to others?  If we are obligated to preserve our own lives, this is an obligation 
to refrain from being careless and foolhardy -- not an obligation to protect ourselves 
at the expense of the ideals we (rightly) hold dear. 
 
In short, though it is possible to err on the side of taking morally unnecessary risks 
to one’s own well-being, I would rather make this sort of mistake when I am 
confident that I would not be doing anything wrong than refrain from sticking my 
neck out when I should.  The moral exemplars suggest that I am less likely to err in 
the second way if I am more strongly disposed to do what I can.  This prompts the 
question:  is there anything I might do to strengthen this disposition?  
In what remains of this paper, I will explore one response to this question I find 
especially intriguing.  This response begins with a simple observation:  if, as I have 
argued, moral exemplars focus more attention than most of us on what they can do, 
this seems to be because they focus less attention on themselves.  More importantly, 
whatever their motivational structure may actually be, such people challenge us to 
consider the extent to which courage depends on a looser attachment to the self 
under threat.  To be sure, people with the capacity to see what they ought to do 
under the sort of threatening circumstances that interest me here may be quite 
frightened about what will happen to them if they stand up to the forces of 
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safest way of standing up to these forces.  Nonetheless, their fear and prudence do 
not manifest themselves in a paralyzing preoccupation with determining how to 
avoid paying the price of resistance.42  This, at any rate, is the hypothesis I wish to 
explore.
Insofar as the precious self figures less prominently in the deliberations of people 
with moral courage, these people satisfy a condition widely attributed to all 
varieties of virtue.  True virtue, many philosophers point out, is not simply a matter 
of being disposed in most circumstances to give less weight to the reasons that favor 
stealing or lying or killing; it involves having no inclination to consider such reasons 
for wrongdoing in a wide range of circumstances.43  The examples offered in making 
this point are usually cases in which it is obvious to us, the readers, how a virtuous 
person would act.  But moral exemplars who stick their necks out in defending basic 
human rights remind us that when it is not obvious to us whether we should take 
certain risks, this may well be because we are trying to determine the moral 
significance of self-protective actions whose efficacy we should not even be 
considering. 
Not only, then, does privileging can over ought -- experiments in resistance over 
reasoning about whether it makes sense to resist -- enable morally conscientious 
human beings to shift their attention away from the reasons they have for keeping 
their heads down; being disposed to privilege can over ought also reflects the 
disposition to grant oneself a less privileged position among the things one 
considers in deciding what to do.  I want to explore this admittedly rather vague 
hypothesis by exploring the hunch that the sort of courage we need in the sort of 
circumstances I am here discussing is inseparable from a profound kind of modesty.  
I am attracted to this idea, and I will try to present it in such a way as to reveal its 
attraction.  My main aim, however, will not be to defend this conception of virtue, 
but to consider whether it is rational and/or possible to relate to oneself in this way, 
and whether, if so, this self-relation is a valuable (even essential) component of 
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when she relates to herself in this way, her courage -- her “blessed stiffness before 
the outward and inward terrors”-- is more likely to strengthen or to undermine her 
capacity for moral discernment.  I will work my way up to these questions by first 
very briefly noting some other attitudes one might cultivate in order to overcome 
the morally corrupting influence of self-love.
*
What would it take for me to be more strongly disposed to silence the demands of 
the precious self under circumstances when it seems to me that I would have to put 
myself at great risk in order to avoid accommodating injustice?  If I were a (certain 
sort of) utilitarian, then this question would come down to the question of what it 
would take for me to care enough about others.  If, as at least some utilitarians 
claim, a morally conscientious person were someone who gives no more weight to 
her own cares and concerns than she gives to anyone else’s, then in order to 
establish the proper attitude toward my self-preservation, I would simply need to 
ask myself whether doing what is most likely to preserve my life would also 
preserve a greater number of other human lives -- or, perhaps, contribute more to 
the quality of such lives -- than anything else I might do.  According to the 
utilitarians, if I fear that I will be disinclined to ask this question when my safety is 
at stake, then I had better get in the habit of asking it now. 
Even if I were a utilitarian, however, I would not have much basis for thinking that 
my concern for the greatest good of the greatest number would suffice to enable me 
to discern which actions this concern calls for in the sort of circumstances that 
interest me here.  More importantly for my purposes, I do not endorse a utilitarian 
conception of moral agency.  My commitment to “doing the right thing” is not a 
commitment to giving equal weight to the interests of all beings with interests.  Nor 
is it a commitment to identifying my interests with theirs.44  I cannot improve my 
ability to discern the moral distinctions that matter to me by determining which 
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Hatred is another attitude that can dispose me to overcome the effects of fear.  But 
even if there are occasions on which it is a fitting attitude, I will always strive to 
avoid it.  I noted earlier that anger can also motivate us to be far less self-protective 
than we would otherwise be.  But when it is mixed with fear, anger often moves us 
to find substitute, inappropriate, targets.  Perhaps more importantly, I do not 
believe there is anything I could or should do now to become more strongly 
disposed to adopt this attitude under the circumstances in which it would move me 
to do the right thing. 
It might seem that I could secure the sort of disposition I seek by cultivating a 
stronger love of others.  But I do not seem to be able to love more than a very few 
individuals; and my love of “humankind” is even less tied to determinate 
imperatives than my commitment to doing “the right thing.”  The same limitations 
apply to the closely related attitudes of sympathy, empathy, and compassion.  
In any case, my tendency to give too much consideration to my own precious self is 
not, most fundamentally, a problem concerning my relation to others.  The problem 
is simply that I have too much love and sympathy for myself.  If I am to solve this 
problem, I must acquire a greater indifference to my own fate; I must come to care 
about myself far less than I do now.  
This suggestion evokes a comparison:  “far less.”  It seems to me, however, that the 
economy of self-concern is such that unless caring far less is caring very little, it will 
have at most a small impact on the relative weight I give to my own well-being.  
Unless caring far less amounts to caring very little, my moral sense is unlikely to be 
sufficiently “stubborn” to prevent me from dwelling on how I might best protect 
myself when I know that I will put myself at far greater risk if I do what I suspect 
might well be the right thing to do.  With this thought in mind, I want to consider the 
possibility of a more dramatic transformation in my attitude toward myself.  I want 
to consider what it would be like if I were to cultivate a sort of indifference toward 
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moral benefits will result.  This indifference-as-profound-modesty might just as well 
be characterized as a modesty so profound as to approach indifference.  It is an 
attitude that can be summed up with the simple acknowledgment that I am not 
really all that important. 
This attitude does not imply that my life is not worth living, nor even that it is not 
quite wonderful to be alive.  It is not to be confused with low self-esteem, or (if this 
is different) the belief that one is not worthy of respect.  Nor does it imply that fear 
is never reasonable, nor that there is really no reason for me to look both ways 
before crossing the street.  I suspect that those with more knowledge of Buddhism 
than I have could find more evocative ways of describing what I have in mind. The 
basic point is that my self-concern is a brute fact, not a well-founded appraisal -- and 
that a careful appraisal would raise serious questions about its warrant.  On this 
way of looking at things, though I should certainly aim not to be foolhardy, if a car 
hits me before I make it to the other side, there is an important sense -- a sense 
important enough to be incorporated into my being-in-the-world, and thus 
important enough to have an impact on what I take into account when I decide what 
to do -- in which this unfortunate accident is really no big deal.  If I need to make this 
point vivid, I can simply imagine how someone would appraise my life ten thousand 
years from now.  My life and death matter very much to a very small group of 
people.  But, as we say, “in the scheme of things,” this is really not very much at all. 45 
*
Surely, this insight is at least part of the Socratic lesson that philosophy is the art of 
learning how to die.46  The true philosopher has no interest in defending her ego; 
she delights in discovering where she has gone wrong.  The true philosopher takes 
Truth and Justice and Beauty very, very seriously.  But she takes a very different 
attitude toward herself.  This is why she is not frightened that her devotion to Truth 
and Justice and Beauty will get her into trouble with the people in power.  When 
they seek to put her to death on trumped up charges, she will stick up for herself.  















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
supply of delicious meals.47) But sticking up for herself will, for her, amount to 
nothing more nor less than sticking up for Truth, Justice, and Beauty.  Having done 
what she can in their service, she will let the chips fall where they may.48  
According to Socrates, all philosophy is applied ethics.  It is training in how to be 
good.  Done right, philosophical inquiry involves no illusions of self-importance; and 
so, it involves no fear of self-annihilation.  This is, in effect, Iris Murdoch’s point 
when she commends the love of truth as an antidote to the psyche’s “anxiety-
ridden” need to “relentlessly look after itself.”  “Goodness,” Murdoch says, “is 
connected with the acceptance of real death and real chance and real transience and 
only against the background of this acceptance, which is psychologically so difficult, 
can we understand the full extent of what virtue is like.  The acceptance of death is 
an acceptance of our own nothingness which is an automatic spur to our concern 
with what is not ourselves.”49  
If philosophy teaches us how to die, this is because, done right, it forces us to 
abandon the illusion of self-importance.  One reason to do this is that, all else being 
equal, it is better to see things clearly.  But, as the preceding reflections indicate, a 
further reason is that the more vividly we apprehend our own relative 
unimportance, the less vulnerable we will be to the vice of cowardice; we will be 
more inclined to focus our attention away from ourselves; and this will enable us to 
care more about what we can do than about whether we have good enough reason 
to do it.  Of course, philosophy is not for everyone.  And it is all too easy to engage in 
philosophical inquiry without absorbing the Socratic lesson.  The point is simply 
that insofar as Socrates is a moral exemplar, this is because he exemplifies a way of 
relating to himself that we should all strive to emulate, regardless of whether we 
adopt his particular method for learning to relate to ourselves in this way.
Someone who is less firmly attached to herself than to basic human rights will find it 
especially difficult to “live with herself” while she wittingly accommodates injustice.  
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someone whose dispositions are incompatible with the moral ideals of the “I.”  For 
this “I” to say that she could not live with “herself” if she were to accommodate 
injustice in a certain way is for her to confess that, under these circumstances, there 
would be nothing left of this self with which she identifies.  She is saying that she -- 
the “I” -- would not be identical with the self she would be protecting.  So, protecting 
this self would not be protecting herself.  Protecting “herself” under these 
circumstances would be protecting a usurper.  Better to die than to identify oneself 
with someone who is committed to betraying one’s deepest ideals.
Arendt is among those who suggest that this feature of exemplars provides us with a 
heuristic of sorts:  the most reliable criterion for determining when and how we are 
justified in accommodating evil, she suggests, is whether we can “live together with 
ourselves.”50  It might seem that applying this criterion involves taking one’s own 
integrity to be more important than anything else; and this would seem to be 
incompatible with the self-relation I have here been advocating.  Though Arendt 
encourages this thought insofar as she contrasts (i) being concerned about whether 
one can live with oneself with (ii) being concerned about which actions are 
compatible with one’s ideals, the thought -- like the contrast -- is confused.   The 
point of calling the test of whether one can live with oneself a “heuristic” is simply 
that because one cannot endorse an ideal without believing that one ought not to 
betray it, the conviction that one would be betraying one’s own ideals just is the 
conviction that one would be doing something wrong.   Given that being “true to 
oneself” requires that one has assumptions about what one is justified in doing, the 
commitment to being “true to oneself” is no independent guide to doing the right 
thing; and so, it is not a guide that involves attributing supreme importance to 
oneself; and so, it is not incompatible with the commitment to learning how to die.
*
At the end of many hours of speaking to the journalist Gitta Sereny, Franz Stangl, 
Commandant of Treblinka, finally comes to see what he had not seen even long after 
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my guilt . . . my guilt . . . only now in these talks . . . now that I have talked about it all 
for the first time. . . . “ He stopped. . . . After more than a minute he started again, a 
half-hearted attempt, in a dull voice.  ‘My guilt,’ he said, ‘is that I am still here.  That 
is my guilt.’  ‘Still here?’  ‘I should have died.  That was my guilt.’ ‘Do you mean you 
should have died, or you should have had the courage to die?’ ‘You can put it like 
that,’ he said, vaguely, sounding tired now.”51 
This is the confession of someone who went along with one violation of basic rights 
after another until he was no longer just going along.  Stangl is the anti-exemplar, if 
anyone is.  And it is precisely as such that he is instructive.  Ever anxious to protect 
himself and his family against catastrophic loss, he somehow lost sight of the fact 
that when it comes to being the commandant of an extermination camp, there are no 
pros to counter the cons. 
Stangl is a vivid reminder of the fact that there are clear limits to what we are 
justified in doing to save our own skin, and that, nonetheless, our self-concern can 
so blur our vision -- it can so corrupt our reason -- that we mistake the limits for the 
fuzzy boundaries.  Not only can fear, and the associated demands of self, tempt us to 
justify our complicity with evil by tempting us to appeal -- more or less explicitly -- 
to the obscure distinction between doing and allowing; it can also lead us to obscure 
the distinction between allowing others to act in ways incompatible with our ideals 
and betraying these ideals ourselves by what we allow others to do.  
Stangl singles out one factor, in particular, that makes it especially difficult to accept 
that no further accommodation is justified. “‘If I had sacrificed myself,’ he said 
slowly, ‘if I had made public what I felt, and had died. . . . it would have made no 
difference.  Not an iota.  It would all have gone on just the same, as if it and I had 
never happened.’”  This is his response to Sereny’s suggestion that if he had “found 
the extraordinary courage” to “stand up for his principles,” “it would have had an 
effect on the people who served under you.”  Though conceding the truth of his 
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think somewhere, underneath, it would have affected the atmosphere in the camp, 
would have given some others courage?’” Once again, Stangl demurs: “Not even that.  
It would have caused a tiny ripple, for a fraction of an instant -- that’s all.”52
Sereny suggests that, no matter how saturated with evil our circumstances may be, 
we can never be certain that “standing up for our principles” will have no beneficial 
results “somewhere, underneath.”  In making this point, she is more tentative than 
Arendt, who heaps scorn on those Germans who insisted that they would have stuck 
out their necks if only this would have done any good.  There are, Arendt insists, no 
“holes of oblivion” in which brave human beings and their deeds will remain buried 
forever, benefitting no one in any way, not even as a source of inspiration.53  
But this is surely false.  Not only will many acts of resistance come to naught, but 
even acts which have symbolic value only -- as expressions of what one “stands for” 
-- may cause no more than a tiny ripple, for a fraction of an instant -- that’s all.  
Sereny is right that one can hardly ever be absolutely certain that this ripple will not 
turn into a wave.  But surely, the probabilities are sometimes pretty clear.  What 
matters in a case like Stangl’s is not -- as Arendt and Sereny suggest -- whether any 
act of resistance is likely to have at least some small measure of utility.  Rather, 
Stangl’s mistake was that he was too concerned about himself to see that his life was 
not worth saving in the only way he believed he could save it.  (In this respect, his 
decision is worth comparing with Conrad’s Jim:  Jim should not have jumped ship, 
even if he could have saved no lives by staying on board.) At other points in her 
work, Arendt concedes the point.  The people, she tells us, who were willing to die 
rather than to support an evil regime acted as they did, not because “the world 
would then be changed for the better, but simply because only on this condition 
could they go on living with themselves at all.”54 55 
*
In thus insisting that efficacy is not a necessary condition of justified self-sacrifice, I 
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the (im)permissibility of any accommodating act or ommission.56  It is perhaps even 
more important to stress that I do not mean to be suggesting that the sort of 
indifference to self I am exploring here is easy to acquire.  Though one’s natural, 
primitive impulse to protect oneself is not a rational response to the value of what 
one is trying to protect, one can acknowledge as much while remaining 
disproportionately concerned about one’s own well-being.  Thus, nothing I have said 
in the last pages of this investigation challenges my initial conclusion that it is very 
difficult to develop the “the stubborn moral sense” that would enable me to 
recognize when I must be willing to suffer the sort of terrible losses an oppressive 
regime is willing to impose.  Even if one sincerely believes that a cockroach crawling 
on one’s face is no more threatening than a feather, one may be overwhelmed with 
revulsion and horror when those little legs are moving on one’s skin.  So, too, from 
the fact that one sincerely believes that it is really not so important to protect 
oneself, it does not follow that one has managed to “silence” the self’s demand for 
protection; it does not follow that one has overcome the insidious influence this 
demand has on one’s assessments of the reasons pro and con.57 
It is one thing to acknowledge that in the scheme of things I am not all that 
important.   It is another thing altogether to experience this conviction emotionally -
- as I experience my fear and self-love.  If my belief in my insignificance remains 
detached from my emotions, it is unlikely to counteract the emotional influence of 
my fear and self-love.  It is unlikely to determine how I weigh the reasons for and 
against sticking my neck out.  It is unlikely to play a decisive role in how I apply 
what I know.
This is an important challenge to my hope that I could moderate my self-love by 
reminding myself (over and over) of the important sense in which I am really not 
much to fuss about.  Before I pursue this challenge any further, however, I want to 
consider a problem posed by the content of the attitude I am here recommending.  
This is a problem faced by any precept that stresses the unimportance (even the 
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view of the universe, how could we consistently refrain from seeing others this way 
as well?  And if they, too, are not really all that important, then why make such a fuss 
about how they are treated?  Can I consistently adopt the perspective I am here 
recommending without thereby taking the very perspective that is associated with 
those who wield power in the most unjust and inhumane regimes?  What 
distinguishes (i) someone who has freed herself from an unjustified attachment to 
herself from (ii) someone like Harry Lime in The Third Man, who, looking down 
from the top of a Ferris wheel, compares the people below to dots, and avows that it 
would make no difference if some of them “stopped moving forever”?59  Of course, 
someone who exemplifies the sort of “humility” Murdoch champions when she 
urges us to admit that we are rather “small,” not terribly “interesting,” creatures60 
will not have any of the most common motives for subjugating her fellow human 
beings.  (She will not be moved by the lust for power or wealth or recognition.) But 
the conviction that no human life really matters much would seem to be motivation 
enough for treating unaccommodating human beings as impediments to be pushed 
to the side -- or removed.61   
There are passages in The Sovereignty of Good that come frighteningly close to 
sounding like something that could be endorsed by one of today’s radical jihadists.  
We should, Murdoch says, cultivate “an attention which is . . . an attempt to look 
right away from self towards a distant transcendent perfection, a source of 
uncontaminated energy, a source of new and quite undreamt-of virtue.  This 
attempt, which is a turning of attention away from the particular, may be the thing 
that helps most when difficulties seem insoluble, and especially when feelings of 
guilt keep attracting the gaze back towards the self.  This is the true mysticism 
which is morality.”  To be sure, Murdoch concedes that this mysticism is “perhaps . . . 
difficult and easily corrupted.”62  But she does not seem to take this possibility as 
seriously as she should.  We, at any rate, should ask ourselves how “turning away 
from the particular” self is compatible with a commitment to human rights.  How, 
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with us to this earth, while at the same time gazing at a distant transcendent 
perfection?
Murdoch insists that attending to reality unencumbered by the distortions of self-
love is inseparable from attending to other human beings with love and compassion. 
She is right, of course, that it is far easier to care about others when one is not 
preoccupied with one’s own needs and desires.  But how can it make sense to care 
about others if “‘All is vanity’ is the beginning and end of ethics”?63  What does it 
mean to be virtuous if “nothing in life is of any value except the attempt to be 
virtuous”?64  According to Murdoch, “the humble man, because he can see himself as 
nothing, can see other things as they are.  He sees the pointlessness of virtue and its 
unique value and the endless extent of its demand.”65  There is something deeply 
right about this -- something partly captured by my critical response to the 
significance Sereny and Arendt attribute to the prospect of beneficial consequences.  
And yet, . . . 
*
The issue I am raising here might seem to support the suggestion that in stressing 
my own insignificance, I have taken things a bit too far.  It might seem that the 
lesson I should draw from the moral exemplars is simply that I do not matter more 
than anyone else.  As my remarks about utilitarianism suggest, however, I do not 
think that the moral hazards that concern me here can be adequately addressed by 
strengthening my egalitarian impulses.  To be sure, if we have a “moral sense,” then 
our interactions with others will reflect our understanding that we are not more 
important than they are.  But the point of turning for guidance and inspiration to 
human beings who are braver than we are -- or, to speak only about what I know, 
braver than I am -- is precisely that though the fact that I am no more important 
than anyone else appears to support certain principles of justice, it does not appear 
to support any uncontroversial, determinate conclusions regarding how I should 
weigh the importance of defending these principles against the importance of 
protecting myself.  Appreciating the moral equality of all human beings seems to be 
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obligated to stick her neck out -- especially if we grant that respect for the equal 
value of all persons should not be given a consequentialist interpretation.
Perhaps I am mistaken about this.  But even if I were convinced that we can get 
more moral mileage than I think we can out of the fact that all human beings are 
equally important -- and even if we can get more mileage out of feelings of solidarity 
or feelings of love and compassion for humanity -- I would still believe that the 
exercise of trying to see myself as a tiny dot in the universe is of great moral value.  
Many religious rituals are exercises of this sort.  And those of us with no faith in the 
supernatural must find other ways to confront and affirm the significance of our 
insignificance.  
But this brings me back to the apparent difficulty of reconciling any such affirmation 
with the conviction that all those other human dots really matter -- a lot.  I realize 
that things can matter in many different ways.  My question is:  are the ways I think 
human beings really matter independent of the ways I think they do not?  Perhaps it 
is possible to press the sort of point that is often made against the consequentialists.  
The fact that it is wrong to kill another human being, we are reminded, does not 
imply that it is wrong to refrain from “bringing” another human being “into the 
world.”  Why assume, then, that if it is wrong to kill another human being (or 
deprive her of basic civil liberties), this must be because it matters whether -- and if 
so, when -- this being departs from the earth? 
This is not a rhetorical question.  I need to give it more thought.  In particular, I need 
to better understand what I have to assume about the ground of moral obligations in 
order to assume that I can consistently hold the two attitudes I am considering here.  
In other work I have argued that we are justified in treating human beings as 
constraints on what we have reason to do even though they are not ends in 
themselves.66  Rather than rehearse these arguments here, I will simply note that I 
can respect the power and authority of reason -- my own and others -- precisely 
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determining what is important, justifiable, and good.  If, moreover, I respect the 
authority and power of reason, then I cannot consistently dismiss what other 
reasoning beings have concluded about what I and they have reason to do. 
*
The suggestion that we have reason to treat one another as “ends in ourselves” even 
if we are not really ends in ourselves is addressed to the concern I raised about the 
consistency of believing both that there is a sense in which no human being is all 
that important and that there is another sense in which every human being is very 
important, viz, every human being has a claim to be treated as valuable beyond 
price.  Again, I need to give this issue more thought.  At this point, however, I want to 
set it aside.  I want to shift my attention to the fact that even if I cannot consistently 
hold both beliefs at once, this incoherence might not be an insurmountable 
psychological impediment. Though there are obvious costs to incoherence, there are 
sometimes also very significant benefits.67  Given the importance of the benefit I am 
here discussing, I thus want to consider whether it is psychologically possible for me 
to cultivate a profound indifference to my own fate even while remaining 
wholeheartedly committed to basic civil and human rights.  
Note that even those who insist that I am mistaken to regard myself as not very 
important could agree that it is at least sometimes desirable for me to maintain this 
false self-conception — that this is desirable, when, for example, it makes me less 
likely to discount the needs and interests of others.  In short, even if the apparent 
incoherence to which I am here calling attention is a reason to reject the attitude 
toward oneself that I am championing here, we could still have reason to live with 
this incoherence, if it is possible for us to do so.
Is this, in fact, possible?  In Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes 
de Silentio addresses a very similar question when he describes the awe-inspiring 
balancing act performed by the “knight of faith.”  The knight of faith, he explains, 
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same time, he is fully invested in all aspects of his life in a way that requires him to 
be in no way detached from this investment.  
De Silentio confesses that he does not see how this is possible.68  Like Thomas Nagel 
in “The Absurd,”69 he wonders how anyone can occupy a point of view from which 
he is at the same time detached. The difficulty seems to have something to do with 
the necessary conditions of acting for reasons.  No one can deliberate about what to 
do without taking it for granted that her commitments matter; no one can assume 
that her commitments matter without assuming that she has good reason to try to 
fulfill them; no one can assume that she has reason to fulfill her commitments, 
without assuming that it matters what she does; and no one can assume that it 
matters what she does without assuming that she really does matter herself.  Still, as 
I said, not all ways of mattering are the same.  And even if de Silentio is justified in 
wondering whether someone who is wholeheartedly invested in the goals she 
pursues can simultaneously believe that it matters very little whether she achieves 
these goals, I am inclined to think that this is because the two attitudes at issue here 
are in express opposition to each other.  In contrast, there is no such transparent 
conflict between (i) believing that human beings are worthy of concern and respect 
and (ii) believing that it is really no big deal if they die.  I am thus inclined to believe 
that someone can maintain both beliefs at once, even if in so doing she would not be 
fully coherent. 
Of course, it would be much easier for someone to do this, if the “no big deal” belief 
lacked emotional reality.  In this case, she would be like the airline passenger who 
believes that she is perfectly safe even as she is terrified of crashing.  Yet if one’s 
belief in one’s insignificance lacked emotional reality, could it really counteract the 
effects of fear and self-love?  The example of the airline passenger suggests that this 
might be possible.  (After all, her belief in her safety may well enable her to act as 
she would if she were not the least bit afraid.)  Still, as I earlier noted, a powerful 
emotion is less likely to have a morally corrupting effect on someone if she 
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For this reason, I want to return to the challenge I raised and set aside a few pages 
earlier:  is it possible for a healthy human being to feel that she is not terribly 
important -- to feel this in a way that can influence which facts she considers in 
deciding what to do, and what significance she attributes to these facts?  Could I feel 
the truth of my own insignificance in the same way that my fear forces me to feel 
how really, really important it is for me to protect myself against loss of life, liberty, 
and livelihood?  More carefully:  could my belief in my insignificance have emotional 
reality without my suffering the enervation of depression or despair?70
There appears to be evidence that this is, indeed, possible.  Unfortunately, this 
evidence also suggests an additional reason for me to be wary:  not only does the 
content of the attitude I am here exploring appear to be in tension with my moral 
convictions; it also seems that the power this attitude has to influence my reasoning 
is in tension with my reason for cultivating it, viz., that by so doing, I will gain the 
courage necessary to see what my moral convictions imply.  Insofar as I experience 
the truth of my insignificance in a way that is energizing rather than enervating, I 
seem to have a motive for nurturing this experience that is also a motive for 
discounting the claims of my fellow human beings.   
To see what I have in mind, one need merely consider how deeply emotionally 
satisfying it can be to transcend one’s own limitations.  It is liberating to detach 
oneself from the sort of cares and concerns that are the stuff of most human lives.  
There is something exhilarating about setting aside one’s small preoccupations in 
the service of something bigger than oneself.  There is something invigorating in 
risking one’s life.  This means that precisely insofar as the indifference-cum-
modesty/ modesty-cum-indifference I have here been exploring has sufficient 
emotional power to be a countervailing force to fear and self-love, it also has the 
potential to be valued for its own sake.  And this means that anyone who cultivates 
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seek the emotional satisfaction of self-transcendence at the expense of human 
beings and their quotidian cares and concerns. 
This is the danger to which Shulman and Camus alert us when they warn that “it is a 
disaster to be righteous” and to be so “stiffly” committed to a greater good that one’s 
willingness to die for this good becomes a willingness to kill.  If becoming brave 
enough to take the sort of risks I have been discussing here involves developing a 
disposition to shrug one’s shoulders at the demands of the self, then in becoming 
brave enough to take these risks, one runs the very different risk of shrugging one’s 
shoulders at one’s own humane impulses.  In short, insofar as the courage of one’s 
convictions depends on loosening one’s attachment to oneself, it is vulnerable to 
morphing into the courage to overcome one’s convictions.71
Karl Ove Knausgard makes just this point when he discusses the war lust in 
Germany both during the lead up to WWI and after the war, during the rise of 
Nazism:
Wagner, Hoelderlin, Rilke, Hofmannsthal, George, all those writers 
and poets cultivated by German youth, celebrated the great, the 
divine, the essential, and they lauded death, too, which lay beyond it 
all.  Stirb und Werde, die and become – something to die for means 
something to live for. The people, the earth, the war, the hero, 
death.72 
Wagner’s tales of heroism, his great storms of emotion, are to do 
with . . . exaltation and the transcending of the self.  The I of Mein 
Kampf expresses itself in terms of the same model, elevating war 
and the singular life of the self to something untainted by the 
quotidian, a hallowedness meaningful in itself. . . . 73
Inspired by a Paul Celan poem,74 Knausgard identifies (i) the desire to devote 
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the needs and demands of an ordinary human life.  It is, he points out, difficult to 
exalt in transcending the everyday, without ceasing to commune with real human 
beings -- ceasing, that is, to see each human being as an individual ‘you,’ who must 
be addressed as such.  This is the key to the moral bankruptcy of Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf:  it  “contains no ‘you,’ only an ‘I,’ and a ‘we,’ which is what makes it possible 
to turn ‘they’ into ‘it.’”75  
Knausgard reminds us that a lack of concern and respect for other human beings is 
inseparable from a lack of respect for reason.  As Kant explains,76 reasoning requires 
an openness to correction from other reasoners; and this requires taking their 
points of view seriously, and living with them in a way that acknowledges this fact.  
In this paper I have been focusing on how difficult it can be for us to do this under 
conditions in which acknowledging the claims of others requires us to put ourselves 
in danger.  My recent reflections on the emotional satisfaction of overcoming self-
love complicate this story by calling attention to the fact that our capacity to reason 
can be threatened from the other direction as well.  Not only may it be impossible to 
reconcile (i) the conviction that there is an important sense in which no human 
being is all that important with (ii) the conviction that one ought to treat one’s 
fellow human beings as ends in themselves; it also seems that  -- considerations of 
coherence aside -- the very lack of self-concern that can enhance our capacity to see 
things aright is capable of blurring our moral vision.  
This is where my anxious musings have led me.  On the one hand, my capacity to 
reason does not suffice to enable me to draw the moral distinctions that have 
preoccupied me from the beginning of this paper.  It seems, moreover, that when I 
have good reason to be afraid of what will happen to me if I stand up for my ideals 
(and for the human beings whose rights are affirmed in these ideals), I would be 
more likely to consider the things that I should consider, and to give these 
considerations their proper weight, if I were disposed to take myself much less 
seriously than I do now.  On the other hand, if my lack of self-concern were powerful 
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enough to be morally corrupting.  Though I continue to believe that a profound 
sense of my own insignificance is an element of practical wisdom, I also concede 
that acquiring a stronger disposition to transcend the demands of my precious self 
would render me more vulnerable to privileging abstract ideals over concrete 
human beings.
These reflections leave me uneasy.  Yet I continue to believe that it must be possible 
to live with the tensions I have identified here.  Indeed, it seems to me that this is 
what so many moral exemplars exemplify.  Their ability to maintain both (i) the 
attitude expressed in the thought: “the risk I run is really not such a big deal” and  
(ii) the attitude expressed in the thought: “the stakes for which I run this risk could 
not be higher” is an essential component of their moral decency.  This is the ability 
they express when they privilege doing what they can over spending time and 
energy trying to determine what they can justify doing. 
Among the moral exemplars to whom I have turned for guidance and inspiration is 
Camus’s Dr. Rieux.  It is impossible to capture with a few citations the dispassionate 
-- almost chilly -- detachment with which Rieux regards his fellow townspeople.  In 
contemplating what will happen to them if they are struck by plague, he knows that 
“since a dead man has no substance unless one has actually seen him dead, a 
hundred million corpses broadcast through history are no more than a puff of 
smoke in the imagination.”77  He knows, too, that “any victories [over the plague] 
will never be lasting”; the plague means “a never ending defeat.”78  Yet this clear 
vision notwithstanding, Rieux is committed to doing all he can to save lives.  And he 
carries on this fight with a compassion and pity that his growing exhaustion never 
fully extinguishes.  Having mastered the art of learning how to die, Rieux continues 
to care about the living.  He does not try to resolve this tension in his point of view.  
In this way he is able to risk his life daily in order to avoid accommodating the 
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Before the plague “crashed down on their heads from a blue sky,”79 the people of 
Oran were “like everybody else, wrapped up in themselves”; they “disbelieved in 
pestilences.” “They went on doing business, arranged for journeys, and formed views.  
How should they have given a thought to anything like plague, which rules out any 
future, cancels journeys, silences the exchange of views?”80  Rieux notes that these 
people were not to blame for their self-absorption.  Yet after the arrival of plague, 
everything changed.  It was now up to everyone “to do what they could to fight it.”  
“The unthinkable thing would have been not to have brought themselves to [fight].”  
Of course, those who saw things this way could also see “quite clearly a point that 
could be made against [them], which is that [they] were risking their lives.”  But they 
also believed that this was beside the point.  “[T]he question [was] not of knowing 
what punishment or reward [would result].”  “[T]he question was whether or not 
plague was in their midst and whether or not they must fight it.”81 
This is the question that has haunted me since November 9, 2016.  I am haunted by 
my uncertainty about the conditions under which an affirmative answer to the first 
question (“Yes, I am living in the midst of a plague”) supports an affirmative answer 
to the second (“Yes, I must fight it”), and by my uncertainty about what an 
affirmative answer to the second question would require me to do.  Unlike such 
moral exemplars as Rieux, I find these questions to be very difficult to answer.  I do 
not know how to answer them; and from what I can tell, I am in good company.  
Even when the plague that ravishes a community is a bodily illness, and its 
mechanism is perfectly well understood, many of the people living in that 
community will be filled with doubt about what they should do in response.  Rieux’s 
assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, even when it is obvious what needs to be 
done in order to prevent the disease from spreading, knowing which risks one must 
take in order to avoid being a part of the problem is almost never as simple as 
knowing that 2 + 2 = 4.82 83
The moral challenge is far greater when the “plague” is a complex system of 
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the best of the fact that one is trapped in such a system.  But on other occasions, 
such accommodation cannot be justified, even though there is no other reasonable 
means of protecting oneself and the people one loves.  Awaking on November 9, 
2016, I suddenly felt the importance of being able to distinguish the permissible 
from the impermissible accommodations.  And I suddenly felt the dread of realizing 
that I do not know where the boundary lies.  Ever since, I have been thinking of all 
those people who are at this very moment living under regimes that deny them the 
most basic rights -- people who plant their gardens and gather in the evening with 
friends, putting up with a situation that is not only very bad, but very, very wrong.  I 
think about what these people do and what they do not do.  I wonder what I would 
do in their place.  I try to accept the fact that I may never know what I should do -- 




1 I take this advice as a counterbalance to talk of the importance of “standing up to” 
“those in power.”  The poem ends with an ellipsis.  And its final lines are especially 
relevant to my reflections on the danger of devaluing the quotidian:  “There is so 
very much death, and that is why affection/for pigtails, bright-colored skirts in the 
wind, for paper boats no more durable than we are. . . .” (Czeslaw Milosz, “Counsels,” 
New and Collected Poems: 1931-2001(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1988), 
pp. 237-38.
2 Cheshire Calhoun enumerates the sorts of costs that are relevant to my inquiry:  
“contempt, ostracism, loss of a job, penal sanctions, the breakdown of friendships 
and familiar relations, being labeled ‘confrontational,’ “difficult,’ ‘overly sensitive,’ or 
‘militant,’ not to mention the inexhaustible confidence of others that one is wrong.”  
These, she notes, are “public obstacles to integrity.” (Cheshire Calhoun, “Standing for 
Something,” The Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 5 (1995): 259.)
3 One well-known example concerns two Polish poets:  Zbignew Herbert refused to 
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at the end that could serve as a set up for my present musings.  Here is the beginning 
of the final paragraph: “I share Hill’s conviction that, whatever our first-order moral 
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a question we can answer to our own satisfaction unless our sense of balance has 
made the weighing of pros and cons come to seem merely ‘academic.’”(p. 48)
5 See Plato, The Gorgias 469a-479e, trans. by W.D. Woodhead, in Collected 
Dialogues, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), pp. 229-307.
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Times special report on the rein of ISIS in Mosul.  (“The Isis Files,” The New York 
Times (April 8, 2018): 2-11) The report chronicles the “collaboration between the 
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Technical Supervisor from the Iraqi agricultural department who -- in order to avoid 
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exist.” (p. 846) It is important, however, not to forget the reflections that have led 
me to Knausgaard.  As Victor Klemperer makes clear in his daily record of this 
period in his country’s history, many Germans looked down and away despite being 
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